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WINDS OF CHANGE: THE EASTERN CAPE IN WORLD HISTORY

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In the history of the Eastern Cape lay the history of much of the world. A broad claim certainly. . .but reflection on the region's history from the earliest beginnings to the present points to the imaginative possibilities of the Eastern Cape and to the fundamental challenges it confronts Cape today. My paper thus will first locate Eastern Cape history in the broadest terms possible. I will then proceed to an in-depth discussion of two areas of critical importance to the Eastern Cape and to the contemporary world: the environment and poverty and inequality. How do we understand environmental change and poverty in the context of South Africa's transition to democracy? And what might the Eastern Cape's history have to offer the world in this early part of the twenty-first century?

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WINDS OF CHANGE¹

Will the Wind Ever Remember
The Names it has Blown in the Past?
–Jimi Hendrix, "The Wind Cries Mary" (1967)

How is it that so many people have been so poor for so long? Three decades ago historians urgently sought answers to this question. The study of poverty and inequality, locally and globally, sat at the center of a good deal of historical analysis, particularly scholars interested in the "development of underdevelopment." In 1974 Immanuel Wallerstein published the first volume of his study of the making of the world-system, a seminal if controversial contribution to what was then becoming a burgeoning literature on the political-economy of global capitalist development.¹ Wallerstein originally had trained as an Africanist, and it is not surprising that in the midst of the economic crises of the 1970s and the failures of decolonization that other scholars turned their gaze to the political economy. Wallerstein made a favorable impression on Southern Africanists. My elder and now somewhat greyer but still dashing colleague Colin Bundy approvingly used Wallerstein in the first edition of The

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Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry, "probably the most influential account of rural history produced in the 1970s," though the preface to the second edition suggested some hesitancy."²

In recent years, however, interest in the study of inequality has declined precipitously, so much so that the Social Science Research Council of the United States recently pleaded for more proposals for the study of poverty and political economy. The reasons for the decline are complex.³ The increasingly evident theoretical limitations of the "New" Marxism created dead-ends without much promise of safe detours. The failure of communism did not help much either. Articles and books on inequality and poverty now seem slip between a few left-wing journals and publishers on the one hand, and neo-classical "free market" oriented economists. Not much of a middle-ground exists. In addition, in some quarters once bold arguments dissolved into uncritical conventional wisdom; peruse for example most recent textbooks on South Africa. More broadly, the conservative tide coursing throughout much of the west and the wave of cultural studies that was willing to treat society as a mere "spectacle" or, more (in)famously, proclaim the "death of reality," combined to help create a kind of anaesthetization concerning issues such as poverty and destitution. But of course all representations ultimately are *about* something, and that something can be dated, located in time and space, even if we can never be sure what was going on in the minds of those producing the archival record or in the constitution of memory of time not forgotten.

Poverty and inequality cannot be wished away, and to say as some politicians have suggested that the poor are always with us is to participate in the same sort of illogic that helped create and sustain crises in places like Bosnia and Rwanda. Poverty today is undeniably a world problem. We don't have to go far to see it. Much of Africa continues to face a prolonged food crisis. In neighboring Zimbabwe a combination of drought and a precipitous and shameful descent into authoritarianism and corruption has produced widespread hunger. Mozambique, just beginning to lift itself from a decades old civil war, has stumbled before a series of floods and droughts. More broadly, Africa remains in the grips of a food crisis as domestic production continues to slump, conflicts grind on, populations and especially cities grow, and the specter of famine looms in the countryside. Africa remains the poorest continent in a world of some 5.6 billion people, eight-four per cent of whom living in the developing world. Three billion people attempt to live on two dollars or less per day; 1.3 billion people attempt to survive on one dollar a day, the World Bank's rather arbitrary figure separating extreme poverty from outright destitution.⁴ Globally, there are more people living lives of poverty and destitution than ever before and inequality has grown to levels never before imagined. . .or experienced. Amidst this poverty is a world healthcare system in great crisis, collapsing infrastructure and continuing

environmental degradation. In a number of areas life expectancy has been steadily declining with rising morbidity and mortality rates.⁵ In 2000 alone some 1.7 million children died from inadequate food or healthcare, a figure that is twice the number of those slaughtered in the Rwandan genocide. Inequality also has grown. In 1999 the combined wealth of the richest three people exceeded the GDP of the poorest 48 countries. The income distance between rich and poor countries has widened, from a factor of 3 to 1 in 1820 to 74 to 1 in 1997: the top 20% of people in the richest countries earned 74 times the income of the lowest 20% in the poorest countries.⁶

The Eastern Cape is part of this landscape of great poverty and human suffering. The Eastern Cape may be South Africa's most impoverished region, but it has no monopoly on systemic insecurity. There is of course much to celebrate today, as there has been in the past; we stand on hallowed ground and before a heroic history. But let us not forget, as those who wield power so often and so conveniently do, of the long history of violence, misfortune, injustice and crime that is this land. Of acute importance is everyday suffering, the state of emergency that is the lives of the very poor and the destitute, the histories of the "discarded people," the title of the searing book by the Franciscan priest Cosmas Desmond. In 1969 Desmond visited Dimbaza where "The signs of malnutrition are obvious. . .and there have been many deaths." Over seventy-five per cent of the graves belonged to children. Desmond met one woman who had given birth to six children. Two had died, two were suffering from "'gross pellagra'," and a fifth child had been hospitalized from malnutrition.⁷

Grinding poverty, premature deaths, stunted lives, have been constant features of the Eastern Cape for well over a century. Think, for a moment, of infant mortality. The figures we have for the early part of the twentieth century range from twenty percent to much higher, sometimes over fifty percent. These rates of premature death have been stubbornly constant. Take, for the sake of argument, a population of 750,000 and a birth rate of just 2 percent, both conservative figures; in a century 375,000 infants would perish. Add to this the deaths attributable to intestinal diseases, TB and the physical and mental maladies that accompany malnutrition, and one is faced with an extraordinary wastage of human life and capability.

This is the stark picture of poverty conventionally conceived, one centered on income, or more accurately what economists with their penchant to use nouns as adjectives call "income deprivation." However, as scholars have pointed out, income (whether personal or household) often is but a crude measure of well-being. Recently the scholarly and international development community has recognized systemic insecurity

as a central component of world poverty. Vulnerability is now seen as both a cause of poverty and an important barrier to its alleviation, a central component of a vicious cycle the world over. Much of the most recent work on systemic insecurity has been produced by economists such as Dasgupta and Sen who have been interested in understanding the seemingly intractable problem of poverty and inequality throughout much of the postcolonial world. Where previous economists, from various ideological positions, have tended to focus on large-scale models of economic behavior and change, scholars such as Sen have shifted attention away from narrowly economic explanations of why so many people in the world remain so poor. Instead they have emphasized human capabilities and "capability deprivation," that is the reasons why people end up in situations in which they are unable to take advantage, or full advantage, of resources and opportunities so that they can "lead the kind of lives they value—and have reason to value. . . .the substantive freedoms that people have reason to enjoy."⁸ Poverty is thus to be measured less according simply to income than on the basis of "deprivation of basic capabilities."⁹

The human capabilities model is not without its critics. In many respects it is less a model than an approach, ultimately a philosophical perspective rooted in Aristotlean thought about what comprises a worthy life. The model deploys a highly abstracted and static conception of the individual and struggles mightily with intra-societal disagreement over what precisely defines a worthy life. It can be starkly ahistorical, though it need not be so in theory. For systemic insecurity raises quintessentially historical questions. How, for example, have temporary vicissitudes such as crop failure or political conflict created situations in which people find themselves living more or less permanently insecure lives. Why, at some times were people able to "bounce back," as it were, but not at other times? How have people managed, or failed to manage, risk? Why has engagement with, and increasing dependence on, the market been a boon to some but a disaster for others? And how has what social scientists call the "reproduction of the household" changed (or not changed) over time—the ways in which production, consumption and labor are organized in such a way to keep the household going?

In this paper I wish to provide an overview of the history of the making of systemic insecurity in the Eastern Cape by locating that history in three world historical developments: climate change; violence; and the spread of European-dominated market economies. In a nutshell, my argument is that the beginnings of systemic poverty are located in the first great age of globalization, in the period roughly from the early nineteenth century through the Scramble for Africa and the rapid imperial expansion of the 1880s and 1890s. Importantly, this period largely predates large-scale labor migration to the mines, legislation such as the 1894

Glen Grey Act, or later segregationist legislation such as the 1913 Natives Lands Act and, particularly for the second half of the century, generally has been presented as a era of relatively prosperity before the fall to proletarian poverty. The globalizing world of the nineteenth century was as much sown together as much by commerce as by violence, the violence of conquest. Violence helped establish the non-economic foundations of economic poverty. Importantly, violence unfolded in the context of two important, large-scale, indeed global contexts. The first, which I have alluded to above, centers on the very rapid monetization and expansion of globalized market economies. The second is altogether different but similarly vast: changing world climate patterns. These world patterns—colonial violence, climate, globalized markets—produced subsistence crises across much of what was becoming the colonial world, from Africa to India to China and across the great Pacific Ocean as well as in places like north-eastern Brazil. Subsistence crises are of course not new; one need only recall the Bible's "seven years of plenty, seven of lean" to consider the apprehensions and dangers farmers have faced the world over. What was new was some of people's responses to them. Most importantly for my purposes, localized responses to these crises typically have become long-term historical patterns and not episodic, if tragic, events. It is this triangulation—colonial violence, climate change, globalization—that I think holds the key to understanding poverty in the Eastern Cape and I suspect in other parts of the colonial and post-colonial world.

What do we make of these three nineteenth-century developments: conquest and its attendant violence; recurrent drought in an overall changing and less hospitable environment; and a rapid monetization of the economy? Davis, writing more generally, has argued that the second half of the century witnessed no less than three "global subsistence crises," at the end of the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s, respectively. These crises resulted in the starvation of anywhere from thirty-one to sixty-one million people and marked, according to Davis, the beginnings of the Third World.¹⁰ Together they comprise a kind of "secret history of the nineteenth century," involving climate change, colonialism and capitalist development, that together "contradict[s] much of the conventional understanding of the economic history of the period."¹¹ Certainly Davis's depiction of extraordinary suffering in places like India, China or Brazil, stands in marked contrast to most historical analyses of British Southern Africa and, especially, the Eastern Cape.¹² Instead of a century of subsistence crises, the nineteenth century has been represented as a period of "peasantization" and the period as a whole as a moment of "peasant prosperity." The market transformed Africans into peasants,¹³ rural people using mainly family labor to produce crops, some of which are sold on the market to pay for taxes and to acquire a limited range of consumer goods. In short, the conventional picture is one of economic and social health, of stability, and of economic progress. But was it?¹⁴

The environmental context

The modern history of the Eastern Cape is in many respects the history of a frontier becoming a periphery, a space of difference and intensive interaction marked by expansion and instability becoming a "hinterland. . . linked to a central core."¹⁵ A historic frontier, the Eastern Cape also is a ecological and biological one. Of particular importance is climate and rainfall. At the highest level of generality, the past three millennia has seen "gradually increasing temperatures and decreasing rainfall" in Southern Africa.¹⁶ In climatic terms the period around from around 1570 through the eighteenth century was more supportive of agriculture than the nineteenth century. Rainfall was likely higher and, importantly, less variable. In contrast, the nineteenth century marked a period of particularly temperamental weather; 1860-1920 especially was a "protracted period of reduced [tree] growth in the summer rainfall area."¹⁷ Moreover, and importantly for our purposes, "present climatic regimes" appear to have been "established by at least 1800."¹⁸

This new climatic regime has been, but by no means consistently, teleconnected to broader areas in the Indian Ocean world and beyond. In other words, at times climatic variability in the Eastern Cape can be coupled with variability elsewhere in the world, though this coupling typically entails time-lags.¹⁹ These wind and rain patterns are, in turn, related to and profoundly effected by the warming and cooling of huge water and air masses over the Indian Ocean and especially over the great Pacific, what is called the global El Niño/Southern Oscillation (ENSO). Massive areas of warm water and attendant high rates of evaporation and precipitation take place across the tropical areas of the Pacific and Indian oceans in what is known as the Walker Circulation. This is a highly dynamic system that powerfully shapes not only cloud formation, ocean temperature and rainfall, but also wind patterns. The Walker Circulation swings between a south-west Pacific orientation and an orientation to the east which brings with it unusually warm equatorial waters to South America which fishermen in Peru greet as Christ's child, El Niño. These changes in and location of ocean temperatures and the circulation of air masses in the Pacific and to a lesser extent in the Indian Ocean shape weather patterns across much of the world, though the precise extent of their impact in some areas remains unresolved. They can cause drought or torrential rains, and the human miseries accompanying both, in a broad swath of the globe stretching from China, Madras to Ethiopia and Mozambique.²⁰ "ENSO is associated with massive geographical shifts in the normal rainfall regime in the tropics, and clearly affects much of Southern Africa."²¹ When ENSO enters a warm phase and ocean temperatures rise and shift eastwards in the Pacific, the El Niño effect, the subcontinent often experiences subnormal rainfall or erratic climatic

conditions. In the period 1897-1988, for example, 70% of El Niño years had below average rainfall in the region 30S-13S and 20E-50E, with rainfall in the driest tercile equalling 45%.²²

Historical climatologists have suggested that the severe drought at the end of the eighteenth century, felt from the Eastern Cape to the Zambezi Valley and clear across the Indian Ocean to New South Wales, represented one of the first modern ENSO events. Beginning around about 1791, droughts and hunger continued in the general Mozambique region up to 1796, as ENSO drew the South Indian Anti-Cyclone eastwards away from the subcontinent and disrupted the seasonal movements of the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone. Other areas were also hard-hit. Seen from the broadest reaches of world climate history, the Eastern Cape in the nineteenth century experienced pronounced variability in terms of rainfall. These natural "events" were often, but by no means always, connected to ENSO phenomenon.

The severe drought at century's end marked the decisive entry of the Eastern Cape into a new, drier period. This drought was clearly connected to ENSO and hit a broad area of Southern Africa. A punishing drought hit the Eastern Cape and Lesotho in the early part of the 1800s, with famine reported in Lesotho between 1802-4. Litchenstein described the drought of 1804-5 as creating a "great defalcation in the usual quantity of corn" and the loss of "a great number of cattle from want of feed." "Whole societies," he continued, "strolled into the colony, in hopes of finding places which had been exempted from the general calamity."²³ In the Natal/Zululand area the drought, marked by some three years without significant rain, came to be known as "Madhlatule (let one eat what he can and say naught)."²⁴ Here the drought was associated with significant political instability and, in agricultural terms, a shift away from maize and back to more drought-resistant sorghum.²⁵

In Southern Africa as a whole there was a "continual decline in rainfall and progressive desiccation of lakes, rivers and springs from about 1800 to 1830, and numerous droughts in the 1820s and 1830s."²⁶ The explorer Steedman believed that the area east of the Bashee River "seldom experiences" a "want of rain," but the areas bordering the colony "frequently suffer severely from continued drought."²⁷ Over the course of the nineteenth century European travelers increasingly described the region as "subject to frequent droughts."²⁸ There were, for example, droughts in the early part of the century and an especially punishing drought in the years 1821-23.²⁹ A major ENSO event struck Southern Africa in 1828, creating dire conditions from Mozambique through Zimbabwe to Zambia and into the Eastern Cape, where one missionary described "two or three years" of harvests "destroyed by [the] Locusts and caterpillars" that accompany drought.³⁰ The droughts during this

decade (the period 1825-9 also saw droughts and dessication) certainly powerfully shaped the Mfecane, though detailed work linking environmental change with the conflict and migrations of the period remains to be done.³¹

The early 1830s saw floods and good rains. Drought, however, returned in the periods 1834-43 and again in 1849-51. In climatic terms the second half of the nineteenth century was an especially turbulent and dry period that roughly corresponds with ENSO episodes. Drought struck in the years: 1855, 1858-59; 1862; 1865-66; 1878-81; 1883; 1885; 1892; 1894; and from 1898-1902. The droughts during the 1860s, at the end of the 1870s and at the turn of the century were especially punishing, reflecting the opposite of conditions two centuries earlier. The forty year period 1850-1890 saw no less than eighteen years of serious drought. Only the years 1862-70 and 1886-96 were reasonably stable. Whereas in the earlier wetter period poor rainfalls may have occurred once in every four or seven years, in the second half of the nineteenth century drought occurred on average every other year; more generally the weather in the nineteenth century was marked by high variability. Most of the major droughts are ENSO-correlated and thus correspond with the historical reconstruction of world climate, in which the second half of the nineteenth century marked a period of pronounced climatic instability, causing widespread crop failures from China, India, to Ethiopia.³²

The correlation of weather and intra-African and European-African conflict is unmistakable. The enormous instability that engulfed much of Southern Africa in the 1820s, for example, unfolded during a period of serious ENSO-related droughts. Most conflicts between Africans and Europeans took place during a drought or shortly after one. Droughts invariably create insecurity, particularly when they are accompanied by crop failure, malnutrition and, in the worst cases, outright famine. The environment, then, was one engine of historical change, particularly when tied to other developments. This was precisely what happened in the nineteenth century, as climate history and colonial conquest unfolded together. So let me now turn briefly to the issue of violence in the nineteenth century.

VIOLENCE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

So much for the weather. A second global trend in the nineteenth century was violence, and particularly the violence of imperial expansion. The peoples of Asia and Africa experienced levels of violence—the political

violence of conquest—that far exceeded their worst nightmares. The coercive power of European states, their capacity to do violence, increased dramatically during this period as "the cost of crude steel dropped by three quarters or more"³³ and new communications systems and bureaucratic rationalization improved coordination. The Snider-Enfield rifles used in the Transkei during the 1870s, for example, tripled the range of the earlier muzzle-loaders. And of course, most infamously, the British had the Gatlin gun. Europeans jealously guarded their military superiority, No wonder that the colonial state attempted to monopolize control over advanced armaments in the disastrous "Peace Preservation Act" of 1878.³⁴

To say that the Eastern Cape in the nineteenth century experienced considerable violence is of course to restate a truism.. The frontier wars seem to have become part of the genetic make-up of many South Africans. Surprisingly little work has been done that really unearths the micro-histories of conflict—who died, which communities were displaced, who benefitted from warfare, and so on.³⁵ Scholars of Southern Africa interested in inequality have tended to see colonial conquest as the prologue to more fundamental and more important historical processes, particularly the growth of capitalism.³⁶ This earlier period, when Europeans first extended control over foreign lands, thus becomes less formative, less constitutive of long-term historical patterns, than later developments such as commodity production, wage labor, and an interventionist colonial state serving the interests of capital and settlers or mediating the inevitable contradictions of capitalist development. The conquest state might have been engaged with "pacification," but the control state that followed it was centrally concerned with collecting revenue and creating an African working class. In this view systemic insecurity results from, for example, uneven development or a predatory capitalism and interventionist state which resulted in a highly uneven allocation of economic resources. Recent surveys of South Africa specifically, and Africa more generally, have tended to reproduce this conventional wisdom by avoiding any attempt to establish connections between the early violence of empire and later patterns of rural inequality.³⁷

Here I seek an answer to an ostensibly straightforward question: to what extent did conquest and the years immediately following it comprise a period of fundamental historical transformation? Underneath this question lay other, more complicated ones. To what extent, for example, did impoverishment have formative roots in the "colonial moment"³⁸—in the violence of conquest, in the politics of collaboration and control, and in the decisions people made within contexts of considerable and often desperate insecurity? To what extent did conquest threaten food entitlements; if so, for how long and to what extent? Finally, what is the

relationship between displacement, people forced from their homes during moments of violence, and vulnerability?

Another way of looking at these questions is to explore the political foundations of economic crises and to determine whether or not conquest also created a subsistence crisis. Recent work on famines in the twentieth century has emphasized the link between political instability and conflict, food shortage, and the creation of enduring patterns of impoverishment. This work has highlighted, for example, that famines may occur in situations in which there are food supplies but political conflict or political ineffectiveness, particularly the absence of democratic accountability, disrupt people's ability to protect food entitlements. Policy-makers have stressed the importance of enhancing security so that people are better able to manage risk and misfortune.³⁹ Contemporary crises, however, typically have unfolded in contexts of considerable pre-existing insecurity. That earlier history indeed may lead to or exacerbate political conflict, creating a vicious circle in which economic and political crises feed off one another.

In the general region seven colonial wars had broken out prior to the great conflagration of 1851-3. In the second half of the century colonial warfare took place primarily east of the Kei River, where protracted wars erupted in 1865, 1872, 1878, and 1880. Here conflict erupted sometimes with the introduction of new policies and after, not before, the British had extended colonial rule to an area. In total, eleven wars convulsed the region, a century of warfare in a region roughly the size of [], earning the Eastern Cape the dubious honor of being a highly expensive piece of colonial territory with little financial reward. Seemingly innumerable raids and reprisals punctuated these more serious and obvious moments of colonial political violence. The nineteenth century was quite simply a period of extraordinary conflict, unimaginable in terms of local history and unparalleled in the history of British Africa during this time.

The war of 1851-3, usually described as the Eighth Frontier War, is especially notable because it marked the arrival of total war, in which the destruction of communities and property became an object of warfare. By this time laying waste had become perfectly acceptable policy in many quarters of the world, particularly if one's victims were not white. During the war officers commanded their troops to destroy people's means of subsistence. To Africans this was new, shockingly new, as also was warfare prosecuted at crucial moments within the agricultural cycle.

For at least six months colonists held the losing hand in the conflict. The destruction of farms and the African mutilation of corpses—a traditional feature of warfare—contributed in no small measure to raising the pitch of colonial hyperbole and increasing the bloodlust of white farmers and colonial troops. In the winter of 1851, when the food supply typically was at its lowest, the situation began tilting in favor of the British. By this time drought had returned to the region, the second in just a few years. Reinforcements swelled the colonial forces, so that by the end of the year, and the middle of the agricultural cycle, Smith had at his disposal nearly nine thousand regulars, the Cape Mounted Rifles, and colonial commandos hankering for vengeance. Smith also had better weaponry.

Bolstered by fresh men and new weapons, the strategy shifted from defending farms and towns to laying waste to much of the Ciskei region. In late January 1852, some four months into the new agricultural cycle, Smith issued instructions "to spoil the Gaika cattle, to burn all his kraals, the fences of his corn fields, and destroy the corn fields themselves." Remarkably, troops were to be "provided with sickles, dragoon and rifle swords, and will move at day-light in prosecution of this devastation."⁴⁰ This was not mere swagger. Africans who had fled into the hills or the woods could quite literally see troops armed with sickles cutting down crops that were then set on fire. Two months after Smith's command, a soldier wrote to his mother how "each division" of the colonial forces "was to do as much mischief as possible and especially to cut the crops of 'Mealies' (Indian corn) and millet, which were not yet ripe."⁴¹ By this time the decision had been reached to continue the war for "an indefinite period."⁴² Smith's instructions clearly were intended to hit Africans at the worst possible time, just as the grain crops were ripening. People found themselves in the situation of having their grain supply destroyed and their principal source of protein—cow's milk—confiscated by colonial troops. The destruction of crops obviously immediately affected nutrition; it also endangered people's ability to store food for the coming lean months as well as to retain a portion of the harvest for seed.

When planting season came around in late 1852 many people found themselves in a terrible way. Already the war had descended into "a mere hunt." Now troops rode up to Xhosa who "offered no resistance" and simply "shot them down."⁴³ The "enemy," forced to survive on roots, not surprisingly found themselves "in a wretched condition"⁴⁴ and experienced "unprecedented suffering."⁴⁵ In general the British were not especially interested in cataloging the devastation they wrought. The fog of war obscures much of the historical record. Our best data refers to the hundreds of thousands of head of livestock colonial troops captured; Smith carried off some 60,000 head in a single "drive" from Gcalekaland.⁴⁶ It is impossible to determine the percentage of total stock that Smith took from this area. In the much larger Pondoland, in 1895

we know that cattle numbered roughly 130,000 head.⁴⁷ Smith's single cattle drive would thus have represented almost half the total number of Pondoland cattle. In 1891 the number of cattle and horses in Thembuland, an area rather smaller than Gcalekaland, stood at 31,169, roughly half the number of cattle Smith took in a single drive.⁴⁸ In short, while there is little consistently hard data, what evidence we do have points to a quite massive destruction and confiscation of African property.

It is especially difficult to determine the extent of population loss directly or indirectly attributable to the conflict. A broad sense of the destruction meted out by colonial forces is nonetheless clear. Officers directly engaged in the war described areas of the Eastern Cape as "quite empty."⁴⁹ Officials calculated that approximately sixteen thousand Africans died during the war. This figure, however, relates primarily to those who died in active conflict and certainly underestimates considerably the number of fatalities due to starvation, disease and the many maladies that accompany war, as well as the summary executions of people. Total fatalities likely reached at least twenty thousand. A rough guess at the African population of British Kaffraria before the war would be 150,000, with another 50,000 west of the Mbashe River in those areas that experienced military engagements. Using this estimate at least ten per cent of the African population engulfed by the war—that is one in every ten people—died in one of the most vicious and costly colonial wars of the nineteenth century.⁵⁰ In gross terms 16,000 dead does not seem particularly huge given the carnage of the twentieth century, but as a percent of the population this figure is roughly the same as in the genocide in Rwanda in the 1980s or in the USSR during the Second World War.⁵¹

The war was thus very much a decimation, extraordinary in all respects, especially in the Ciskei. One soldier wrote: "We are going on vigorously with the work of destruction, and I have hitherto encountered no opposition. The country appears almost abandoned."⁵² One private wrote of the "fine fun" of "running about burning their houses and taking their horses and cattle whenever we can get hold of them, " of capturing 14,000 head of cattle and "a great quantity of horses a greater quantity of sheep and lots of goats," and of seeing "not so much as one living Caffre in the whole of the Waterkloof but plenty of dead ones....it would surprise you were you to see the carcasses lying," what "[s]tarvation and gunpowder has at last done for the Caffre"⁵³

Starvation had loomed in 1851; the next year it arrived full force, in large part owing to the deliberate policy of "devastation." "The Caffres are nearly all gone" and "those that remain are dying of starvation." In September 1852 another man described a group of people barely living

in a most wretched state of emaciation and weakness, having been nearly starved for want of food, and subsisting entirely on leaves, roots and berries; their arms and legs were more like black sticks than human limbs.⁵⁴

Drought invariably increased insecurity. War plunged the region into a full-scale subsistence crisis. Dependence on "leaves, roots and berries" clearly indicate that people had shifted their strategy of attempting to secure food entitlements away from agriculture and towards gathering wild produce. This was a last-ditch effort when normal food supplies had been depleted and social networks of reciprocity and redistribution failed to create a safety net that helped prevent human tragedy. Limbs like "sticks" are the regrettable hallmarks of famine. And the fact that people were dying for want of food indicates that the social reproduction of the household had in some areas collapsed.

New work on the Transkei is beginning to reconstruct the patterns of colonial violence there as well as the extent of African resistance. Clearly not all areas were so thoroughly ravaged, and some areas such as Pondoland were barely touched by colonial warfare. On the other hand, considerable intra-African violence marked much of this region. The Griqua migrations and, especially, the Mfecane of the 1820s, produced considerable instability from Matatiele in the north right through to Pondoland on the coast and across the Mthatha River to the west. . .in short the entire Transkei region. Griqua and other raid wreaked havoc in the north of the region, while Zulu regiments plundered Pondoland cattle. In the 1830s colonial forces, led by none other than Harry Smith, laid waste to the area, confiscating stock, destroying crops, and killing people, including, most notoriously, the Xhosa paramount himself whose body was mutilated. In just five days, for example, colonial forces captured some 20,000 head of cattle from Gcalekaland.⁵⁵ Regarding one area Smith wrote that "upwards of 1,200 huts, new and old, have been burnt; immense stores of corn in every direction destroyed." Smith's actions earned him the rebuke of Lord Glenelg, who wrote in stern protest to "this desolation of an enemy's country."⁵⁶

One could go on and on. War invariably creates winners and losers. What I want to suggest here is that what was so revolutionary about conflict in the nineteenth century was its role in the creation of poverty. Two issues are immediately important. The first centers on demographic shock. Here, of course, the Cattle-Killing of 1856-7 is especially important and must be placed squarely within the context of colonial warfare and early colonial rule. Millenarian movements became widespread throughout the colonizing world of the nineteenth century. It is within this context of quite considerable insecurity that the Cattle-Killing of 1856-7 unfolded in all its horror. The immediate backdrop was the rapid spread of a livestock epidemic. By 1855 lung sickness

had reached the Eastern Cape and soon killed large numbers of cattle; in hardest hit areas mortality rates reached as high as 66 per cent.^{57 58 59 60 61}

Already scant food supplies had been consumed or destroyed by the end of 1856.^{62 63} By February 1857 starvation had settled into a many communities⁶⁴ Parents gave up their children to save them from starvation.⁶⁵ With winter's arrival, when the food supply is at its lowest, there were "fearful scenes of distress and daily deaths."⁶⁶ "[G]reat distress" prevailed especially "among the aged, infirm, and young."⁶⁷ The Superintendent of the Native Hospital in King William's Town wrote in mid-August of "deaths from actual starvation" occurring on the outskirts of town.⁶⁸

By the end of the month, King Williams Town was thronged, and its inhabitants distressed at the sight of emaciated living skeletons passing from house to house. Dead bodies were picked up in different parts within and around the limits of the Town, and scarcely a day passed over that Kaffirs—men, women, or children were not found in a dying state from starvation. My consulting room was every day surrounded with emaciated creatures craving food, having nothing to subsist on but roots and the Bark of the Mimosa, the smell of which appeared to issue from every part of the body. . . .I have seen old men, and old women in the last stage of emaciation, staggering and about to fall every minute from the exhaustion of starvation.⁶⁹

Precise figures are not available. Officials tallied the number of people migrating into the colony, but did not attempt any sort of census of the numbers of deaths owing to starvation and disease. If later famines in Africa are anything to go by, it is probable that many deaths escaped the attention of magistrates and other officials, of which there were relatively few anyway.⁷⁰

A reasonable, if conservative, estimate would be that at least forty thousand people starved to death or perished from disease in the region west of the Mbashe River in the period 1856-8. Assuming a population of about 200,000 for British Kaffraria, Gcalekaland and Thembuland, the areas where there was adherence to the prophecies, roughly a fifth of the population died. Adding to this figure the number of people who died during the war raises the estimate from one fifth to one third of the population. Certainly the absolute numbers (60,000) are not great. The intensity of the famine, the percentage of the population that perished, is quite extraordinary. Comparative data shed some light on the magnitude of the crisis. About one fifth of the population located in the devastated Deccan districts of Madras perished in the great famine of 1876-8, the most devastating famine to hit the subcontinent in the nineteenth century. This figure is similar to mortality

rates in the horrific Chinese famines at the end of the century.⁷¹ In the 1985 Ethiopian famine, the estimated crude death rate for one hard-hit area was estimated at just under ten per cent.⁷² Even, for the sake of argument, if we doubled the estimated population the mortality rate as a percentage of the population would stand at about 15 per cent, in other words in between the Ethiopian and Deccan examples.⁷³

These figures thus suggest that the situation in parts of the Eastern Cape in the years 1856-7 was nothing short of apocalyptic. In some areas over one half, and sometimes over three-quarters, of the population died of hunger, perished from diseases, or fled in terror.⁷⁴ As suggested above, children, the elderly, and the infirm, died first and in the largest numbers. Sometimes only 35% of the children survived the great calamity; many of these probably had suffered from protein deficiencies which often have long-term health consequences.⁷⁵ Most everywhere "distress" and "great...destitution" reigned.⁷⁶ "[T]he country is so deserted,"⁷⁷ communities rapidly "breaking up,"⁷⁸ entire regions "fast denuded of its population"⁷⁹ and becoming a "depopulated wilderness."⁸⁰ One official described a community of over sixty people, the remnants of paramount Kreli's people, surviving on "what roots they can dig and the milk of seven cows."⁸¹ Disease descended upon the wrecked world of the survivors. Weakened from "long continued want," many "perished".⁸² Nutritional diseases cursed the barely living. There were the distended bellies of kwashiorkor victims, the weakness and spontaneous bleeding from mouths and noses that accompany scurvy, the madness and the fetid sores on the skin of the pellagrin.

Influenza, tuberculosis, dysentery and other intestinal diseases—already a fixture of many communities—insinuated themselves ever more deeply. Towards the end of 1858 smallpox ravaged parts of the Eastern Cape, sometimes infecting virtually all of the inhabitants of homesteads and villages and killing upwards of one quarter of the people in the most severely effected areas.⁸³ Smallpox had hit the region in the middle of the eighteenth century and again in the early 1840s. Morbidity and mortality rates seem to have been far higher in the 1858 attack, probably owing to the weakened state of people as well as to the easier communicability resulting from the villagization. Smallpox would return periodically to the region, rushing like a wildfire through communities, terrifying people with its fevers, pains and disfigurement, sweeping away especially young and old. In later years other afflictions, for example whooping cough and venereal diseases, took their place in a regime of sickness among the destitute.

In addition to outright death either as a result of starvation, the crisis would have had other impacts on the population. The loss of children to starvation robbed communities of an important source of labor once the

crisis had abated and people turned their attention to planting crops. The most obvious impact would have been a decline in the overall birth rate; the famine created a demographic shock. Women suffering from malnutrition, for example, would either have had a suppressed fertility or would have become infertile, what is known as famine amenorrhea. Those women who were pregnant during the early stages of the famine, or who had infant children, would have seen many of their offspring perish, from disease or from caloric and/or protein deficiencies. Conception would also have declined as the result of suppressed sexual desire and postponed marriages. These patterns, moreover, would have shaped people's decisions once the famine ended. In this case there would be a heavy emphasis to produce children, to make up for those who were lost but also to safeguard against future insecurity. Whereas during the crisis the birth rate would have fallen far below its normal level, after the famine it would have seen an equally sizeable increase, creating a steep upward curve in population growth.⁸⁴

My goal here is not simply to shock you, or to so thoroughly depress everyone that we spend the rest of the conference drinking more heavily than we probably will anyway. My point is simply to iterate the centrality of violence in South African history and, particularly, in the history of the Eastern Cape. And I want to suggest that violence has had long-term implications. Four inter-related issues are especially apposite. The first issue centers on the relationship between violence and demographic shock unfolding at the level of individual households. A second issue is the extent to which violence created a subsistence crisis. Third, the second half of the nineteenth century witnessed considerable morbidity and mortality within humans and animal populations. In the case of animals lungsickness, which killed off hundreds and thousands of cattle in the 1850s, continued to afflict livestock well into the twentieth century. The rinderpest pandemic began just three years after the annexation of Pondoland. In the western half of the Eastern Cape famine followed on the heels of conquest. Throughout the era of annexation—that is from the 1850s to the early 1890s—a number of human diseases struck the population, many becoming endemic to the region. Most of these diseases—influenza, smallpox, dysentery and other intestinal diseases, tuberculosis, and dietary afflictions like nutritional anemia—predated large-scale migration to the mines, though everywhere migrant labor contributed to the spread and intensity of a number of afflictions, especially tuberculosis and venereal diseases. In the case of tuberculosis, migrant labor contributed to its spread, but so also did the declining diets of the African poor.

A fourth issue concerns the formation of a sociology of dispute, especially over land, that helped create a world of insecurity that had important and enduring implications for how the African poor organized

economic production. Sara Berry, writing more generally on the topic of rural African history, has argued that conquest and indirect rule created a layer of "unresolved debates over the interpretation of customary rules and the right to enforce them." These debates had, and continue to have, an important bearing on how people gain "access to rural property."⁸⁵ This was certainly the case in the Eastern Cape, most visibly seen in the breakdown of ways of organizing access to communal resources, what Dasgupta has described as the "tragedy of the commons."⁸⁶

An agricultural revolution?

An alternative model of systemic poverty

Colonial conquest, intra-African violence, and the environmental insults of the nineteenth century thus combined to create a less stable world by increasing the extent and depth of vulnerability. With these two developments came systemic poverty and, in some areas, the beginning of lives lived in destitution. A third development, the rapid monetization of the economy, also made its appearance in the nineteenth century and was shaped by and in turn would have a profound impact on the environment and on the ways people struggled to manage instability. Historians have long noted that the nineteenth century witnessed the rise of market relations. Over the course of the century these relations shifted from elephant tusks and animal hides to the exchange of labor, agricultural produce and manufactured goods. Especially in the 1820s and 1830s a roaring trade took place between Africans and European colonists; at the Fort Willshire trade in 1825 colonists acquired over 50,000 lbs. of ivory, mainly in return for beads and other finished goods, representing approximately the slaughter of three hundred adult elephants

By mid-century the ivory supply, which had supported trade for almost a century, largely had disappeared. The vast majority of elephants and hippopotami had been hunted out. There were few other indigenous products, either made or harvested, that held any attraction to European buyers. More importantly for our purposes, the barter economy had largely given way to one based on money. The introduction of colonial taxation that invariably accompanied conquest, especially the hut tax, further encouraged the growth of a monied economy. Increasingly Africans were faced with two major avenues to acquire cash: the sale of produce and the sale of labor.

The historical evidence, however, simply cannot sustain the model of widespread early peasant affluence. Moreover, and crucially, the beginnings and the entrenchment of systemic poverty lay precisely in the decades other scholars have viewed as period of prosperity. Conquest produced the region's first modern subsistence crisis, as starvation and disease, especially in the Ciskei, accompanied military conflict. The Cattle-Killing produced extraordinary havoc and misery. Neither Bundy nor other scholars have explored the economic and social impact of conquest and the immediate post-conquest period, the ways it led to new forms of stratification and the extent to which conquest created a new world of insecurity and vulnerability. Nor have scholars analyzed the impact of droughts and famine as motors of historical change, or of the complicated relationship between environment and political violence. These early crises became an entrenched feature of the lives of the great majority of Africans in the Eastern Cape, transforming an emergency into a more or less permanent feature of social life. And, in addition to these crises, there was the volatile nineteenth century climate that increased the natural risks farmers invariably faced.

Scholars of peasantization have not, of course, simply produced their analyzes out of thin air. For there is certainly ample evidence of an agricultural revolution. Throughout the late 1850s and particularly in the 1860s there is a rich corpus of observation around "increasing" production, even of wealth. This was the heyday of the "rising peasantry." Everywhere in the Eastern Cape, in the face of colonial conquest people turned towards the cultivation of maize. Europeans introduced maize in the seventeenth century; only in the nineteenth century, that is in the era of conquests, did it become the staple crop for Africans. Precise dates are difficult of obtain. West of the Mbashe River maize production "took off" in the period between the 1850s and the 1870s, while in Pondoland maize production roughly tripled in the seventeen years after annexation. The shift towards maize had been completed for the entire region roughly by the end of the 1920s when it is fair to say that the Eastern Cape had become a monocrop economy.

This shift typically has been seen as a response to the market and to the colonial state's demand for taxes paid in cash. There is a good deal of truth in the assertion. Along with small stock like goats and sheep, whose numbers also increased during roughly the same period of time, maize was relatively freely convertible, whereas sorghum and cattle were less so, if for different reasons. But maize could offer other benefits in addition to its liquidity. Maize required a shorter growing period, gave larger yields, and provided as much as 20% more calories than sorghum. If possible, intercropping with legumes maintained the fertility of the soils and, in theory at least, permitted households to cultivate a variety of foodstuffs and to consume a richer cuisine.

Zululand farmers in the eighteenth century planted increasing amounts of maize. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, however, they shifted (at least temporarily) away from maize and back to sorghum in response to climatic change, and especially the hunger and famine that followed the ENSO-related droughts of the time.⁸⁷ By doing so people were, in effect, protecting food entitlements by returning to a drought-resistant crop that may not have produced copious amounts of carbohydrates but at least did produce food in the more arid and less supportive conditions of the time. This was the classic precolonial pattern of people responding to environmental change. One would have imagined that in the Eastern Cape during the nineteenth century much the same would have happened: in the context of insecurity, and particularly given the impressive record of droughts and climatic unpredictability, people would have moved away from maize and intensified the cultivation of sorghum to protect food supplies. There is some evidence that people occasionally attempted to do so.⁸⁸

However, the general pattern was *precisely* the opposite. The expansion of maize cultivation occurred at roughly the same time as the region entered a period of climatic instability marked by recurring droughts. In other words, people increased their reliance on a crop in an environment that did not especially support its cultivation. Maize, moreover, increasingly represented their more important source of food. This paradox of growing something that has a high (relative and absolute) probability of failure characterized not simply the Eastern Cape but other areas of Southern and Eastern Africa. One explanation could be ignorance. Farmers, however, had had experience of maize cultivation for over a century prior to the colonial era. People, importantly, were acutely aware of the relative risks and the benefits of maize and sorghum, both in terms of cultivation and nutrition.⁸⁹ Like farmers everywhere, people knew that all crops have their benefits as well as their pitfalls. Take, for example, sorghum. Sorghum has a longer growing period than maize, roughly between 120-130 days instead of 80-110 for maize. For farmers faced with the inevitable lean months before cultivation a difference of 20-40 days is significant; it is not, as it were, a very good emergency crop. Second, sorghum typically requires a good deal of vigilance to protect the crop from birds who have relatively easy access to the maturing kernels. On the other hand, sorghum is drought resistant, both in terms of the absolute amount of rainfall as well as rainfall variability. And, while it is not nearly as rich as maize in terms of carbohydrates, sorghum is relatively rich in protein and amino acids and is easily digestible once processed and cooked.⁹⁰

A central question is why people broke with historical patterns and increased their dependence on maize, whether cultivated and consumed within the household or purchased on the market, or both. Again, returning to the crop itself is central. Two points in maize's favor are especially important. First, maize provides more carbohydrates and more calories than sorghum. Second, not only does maize have a shorter growing season it is also possible to eat the crop prior to its reaching full maturity, what in the records is typically glossed as eating "green mealies." Third, maize farming requires less labor while the plant is maturing, whereas sorghum demands vigilance to protect the crop from hungry birds. In other words maize offered the possibility of people securing minimal food entitlements quickly, a crucial issue for those who found themselves in positions of insecurity. Planting maize might seem to be an excellent decision for people who had been recently displaced by war or whose crops had been destroyed in military conflict. In such cases the crucial objective would be to attain food quickly. With its shorter growing season and the ability to eat it green, maize promised precisely this.

Choosing maize, however, was a Faustian bargain. Over the course of the entire growing season maize is often more labor intensive than sorghum. Maize presents other challenges. It is, for example, more difficult to store. It is more susceptible to insect infestations and tends to rot in the below ground pits that Africans have utilized since the beginning of agriculture in the Eastern Cape.⁹¹ And while maize provides more calories than sorghum, it also provides far less absorbable protein and ascorbic acid, the latter necessary to stave off scurvy. Of particular importance are lysine and tryptophan, two amino acids that are central to the manufacture of proteins within the body and which are only available through diet. Deficiencies of the two amino acids cause pellagra, effect brain function, produce anemia, weaken the immunity system, stunt growth, increase susceptibility to pneumonia-causing bacteria and viruses, and cause a host of ailments ranging from mania, depression, diarrhea and ulceration to reproductive disorders. Maize is also harder to digest, particularly for young children and especially those who are being weaned from breast milk. A common way to attempt to provide protein has been through beans and other legumes; however these too are hard for children to digest. The lower protein content of maize has had especially disastrous implications for children, especially in the context of rising fertility rates and infant mortality rates and increasing pressure on women to bear offspring. This was particularly the case in those areas that suffered the twin disasters of military defeat and the Cattle Killing. The pattern, as we shall see in the next chapter, has been for infants to fill up on maize and slowly waste away. Quite literally children were "starving on a full stomach."⁹² Tragically, this pattern is not exceptional, in Africa or elsewhere in the world where poverty has become associated with intensive consumption of maize or its equivalent, manioc. In Brazil, for example, Scheper-

Hughes has written that "manioc meal serves as a food substitute more than a food extender, its normal role."⁹³ For children the results of a diet of manioc has been catastrophic.

We also know that maize is vulnerable to drought. Not only does it require more total rain (preferably in the range of about 47-60 inches or 1200-1500 millimeters) than sorghum, maize is a relatively finicky crop. It tolerates a wide range of soils but needs just the right amount of rain in its earliest stages of growth and then again plentiful water in the second month after the plant has broken through the soil. Too much rain in the later stages of growth can cause a whole host of other problems, for example the spread of molds. Its weak root system means that the maize is especially susceptible to strong downpours which can uproot the crop and quickly erode the soils. Finally maize is hard on the soils, particularly in the absence of nitrogen-fixing legumes such as beans. Unfortunately, both maize and beans share a similar index with regard to drought sensitivity. In other words, when the maize crop failed so also typically did the bean crop; in such cases people lost their access to both carbohydrates and proteins.

If we return briefly to the climatic discussed earlier, we quickly realize that much of the Eastern Cape is simply not a good maize growing area. It became less supportive from the late eighteenth century as the region went into a prolonged dry phase marked by droughts and a high variability in spring and summer rainfall patterns. For example, the historical data for Kokstad of 24.97 inches yearly (695 millimeters) made this area barely capable of growing maize. Total rainfall might vary enormously over a period of just five years. Moreover, the variability in rainfall stood at odds with the finicky water requirements of the plant. And, as we know, the nineteenth century saw both increasing aridity and increasing variability. The great exception of course remained some of the coastal areas, particularly Pondoland where sufficient rains better supported maize production.

Why, then, did people break with historical patterns and increase their dependence on maize, whether cultivated and consumed within the household or purchased on the market, or both. The issue is less explaining the maize "miracle" but, rather, why people did not turn away from maize in the context of an environment that increasingly failed to support its cultivation and which could have quite devastating health consequences, particularly for young children. Again, people were aware of maize's shortcomings; there is indeed Southern African folk wisdom that indicates people's understanding of maize as a "fasting" crop, that it provides calories but with high costs. To answer the question we need to scroll backwards and return to the immediate context of colonial conquest. Three answers are particularly suggestive. First, in situations of

exceptional insecurity, people were foremost concerned with securing carbohydrates, the most basic part of their food entitlements. As we have demonstrated, the period including and immediately following colonial conquest was precisely marked by such insecurity. The far shorter growing period and higher carbohydrate content of maize relative to sorghum presented people with the possibility, but not the probability, of securing calories on a short-term basis. This a typical response to insecurity that can be seen the world over. Second, and especially in the context of an expanding market economy, maize has a high liquidity. It does not, for example, carry with it the symbolic weight of sorghum. In addition there was the increasing demand for maize consequent on the rise of towns and cities and the consequent demands of an urban working class. Poor urban populations, as we know, often seek ready supplies of cheap carbohydrates, in the Southern African case maize and sugar. The liquidity of maize provided rural people with the added benefit of being able to, as it were, play the market as one part of their strategy to protect food entitlements.

To conclude by way of summary, what happened in the Eastern Cape, and indeed elsewhere on the continent, is that a short-term strategy became a long-term historical pattern. This shift corresponds with the move from a world of conjunctural instability to systemic insecurity. Maize, either planted, purchased or usually a combination of both, offered a devil's bargain. In general wherever maize cultivation increased hunger and malnutrition followed. The poor turned to maize not because they could sell it to pay taxes, though this certainly would happen. Rather, maize production, the putative economic miracle, was an economic response to the crisis of conquest.⁹⁴ As one observe in the Transkei noted, wherever maize became "the chief food of the people, sooner or later the people's health and labour efficiency decline....pellagra appears....and for every person afflicted with pellagra there are a thousand or more who suffer from dietary deficiencies which have not reached such a degree of severity."⁹⁵

Finally, the shift to maize became inextricably tied to the rise and expansion of a market economy, as Bundy and other demonstrated but as I am suggesting in a rather different manner. Participating in the market economy became one way of attempting to secure food entitlements. Maize offered food and liquidity. During good harvests it was best to consume as much maize as possible, often by converting it into beer, or, if possible, by selling it to traders. During especially good seasons the consumption of maize appeared elastic. But as nutritional dependence on maize deepened, and its purchase on the market economy swelled, the relationship between consumption and price became increasingly inelastic. The demand for maize has changed very little relative to its price.⁹⁶ The predicament has arisen whereby Africans found themselves in a situation where they were becoming unable to alter substantially their purchase and consumption of maize, even when the price of maize rose significantly or if wages were low.

The peculiarities of maize in the context of the monetization of the economy meant that a good year's harvest depressed the prices traders offered for African maize, so that, as one official pointed out in 1910, "the prices realized barely pay for the cost of production."⁹⁷ When crops were reasonably plentiful, "some families had to sell more grain than they could afford,"⁹⁸ what economists call the Giffen paradox whereby people become locked into the market and food entitlements and market relations become inseparable.⁹⁹ As Hill has written, "the rich are those who store grain for a seasonal price rise, while the poor are apt to sell much-needed grain immediately after harvest when prices are lowest."¹⁰⁰ Such were the pitfalls of liquidity in a monetized economy. The other strategy to avoid spoilage was simply to consume as much maize as possible; good harvests meant lots of the beer by which people helped create social bonds within and across communities. In normal seasons people sold part of their grain as a way of preventing spoilage. In bad seasons cultivators borrowed maize from traders. In catastrophic seasons entire communities fell into debt.¹⁰¹ Increasingly, Africans purchased "grain which they previously sold to the Traders,"¹⁰² and, increasingly, this maize had undergone some refinement with such costs passed on to the consumer. In other words, people simultaneously produced, sold and repurchased their subsistence. Food entitlements had become inextricably bound up with the economy; indeed people found themselves in the position of selling their entitlements in the colonial economy.

It follows, then, that the sale of produce is no automatic indicator of well-being, and certainly of "peasant prosperity." The exchange of produce of course had been the single most important indicator of a rising peasantry and is still viewed by obdurate economists as evidence of economic dynamism. Selling produce, however, does not mean people have met their subsistence requirements. Whitehead has pointed out, for example, that "the poorer you are the more coercively you are engaged in selling food. This of course makes complete nonsense of the apparently irradicable economist's habit of referring to that portion of the product which self-provisioner sell as 'surplus. There should be no suggestion that subsistence needs are met before surplus is marketed, nor that the divide between market and non-market is the same as the divide between production for self-consumption and production for exchange."¹⁰³ The sale of crops is no indication of the well-being of the rural economy generally or of individual households.

The agricultural revolution of the nineteenth century has thus been enormously paradoxical. Maize has provided the caloric gruel, and sugar the cheap energy, of the African poor.¹⁰⁴ Insecurity led to the rise of what was in effect a mono-crop economy and not the diversified economy expected by many scholars of

peasant economies. This development was not unusual. Elsewhere in Africa in the context of rising insecurity people have turned to the singular production of carbohydrate producing crops, for example manioc. There were of course exceptions. In some relatively rare cases where households were able to concentrate ownership of considerable, choice land and exert control over labor, people were able to engage in the production and marketing of crops ranging from maize to fruit, wheat to wool. In these cases people were not selling their subsistence. Prosperity often followed.

For the poor, particularly those displaced by war, the agricultural revolution and the shift towards maize within a more monetized economy ultimately unfolded at the level of households that tended to be smaller and more "individualized" in the era after colonial conquest. This was especially true in areas devastated by the Cattle Killing. Living in the rubble of conquest, both men and women engaged in cultivating maize. In other words there was no sexual division of labor whereby men only herded cattle and women only busied themselves with agriculture. Once insecurity deepened males looked elsewhere to feed their families, or entire households deserted rural areas for towns and cities. In the former case, especially since maize required far more labor to produce the same calories as sorghum, women, children and the elderly were forced to do virtually all of the agricultural work. Intercropping declined, soils became less productive, harvests ever scantier. As households planted a smaller range of crops and depended on maize more, agriculture and diets became ever more monotonous. The heavier demands on women's labor, along with increasing nutritional dependence on maize, contributed to the persistently high infant mortality rates that have beleaguered the region for well over a century. These rates remained steady, or increased, in the twentieth century. High infant mortality, and more generally systemic poverty itself, has invariably increased fertility rates. Scholars have tended to assume otherwise; that to have many babies somehow indicated prosperity. The opposite, however, has very often been the case, in the Eastern Cape, and in much of Africa.¹⁰⁵ Areas with high infant mortality rates also had the highest rates of reproduction. In the Eastern Cape, the demographic explosion in many areas during the second half of the nineteenth century—some areas would see the population double every seven years, though not all owing to natural increase—was indicative of the deep poverty and social dislocation of the era around the colonial conquests.

Conclusion

In a recent collection of essays Regarding the Pain of Others, Susan Sontag asks us to contemplate the proliferation of images of human suffering as a mark of modernity and of the ethical and political challenges

posed by contemporary world crises. Sontag begins with a discussion of Virginia Woolf's Three Guineas, written just before the outbreak of the Second World War, and particularly Woolf's discussion of Spanish Civil War photographs with her imagined male correspondent who asks Woolf: "How in your opinion are we to prevent war?" Woolf, then Sontag, challenge just who that "we" are that is barraged with images of horror and injustice.¹⁰⁶ Sontag returns to this question at the end of the book, writing that the dead are supremely uninterested in the living: in those who took their lives; in witnesses—and in us. Why should they seek our gaze? What would they have to say to us?¹⁰⁷

Historians, of course, are supremely interested in the dead; we are in a way forensic humanists coaxing stories from the deceased. My suggestion today is that we need, as it were, to find out where the bodies are buried, to know why and when they died, and to understand better the extraordinary human suffering and wastage of life that comprises much of modern world history. I am suggesting also the utility of looking beyond economic explanations to what appear to be straightforward economic problems. To reduce violence to economics is to engage in a convenient conflation that does not get us very far. We need to know better the history of vulnerability. We need to explore the history of people's decisions about what to plant and how economic resources should be marshaled, how people responded to insecurity within particular political, environmental, and economic contexts. Of absolute importance to many households was the protection of food entitlements, in the crudest form what was entailed to attain enough calories to survive. These were quintessentially short-term decisions that, in this case, became long-term patterns with equally long-term consequences. This transition to systemic poverty and vulnerability repeated itself throughout the colonial world of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and helped lay the foundations for the extraordinary poverty the world confronts today.

In the nineteenth century, that first great age of globalization, new market economies increasingly entered the calculus of people's decisions about what to grow and how to survive. To deduce prosperity from the sale of grains is to engage in a neo-classical blunder that reduces people's agency to "market responses" and which fails to consider the broader historical and environmental context. The issue, and it is a pressing one, centers on understanding better the context within which people have made and continue to make life and death decisions about how to make ends meet. Here, expanding substantive freedoms, that is providing people with choice and the institutional arrangements to protect their decisions, must form the basis of progressive policy and social action.

1. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York, 1974). See also Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York, 1969). For a searing critique of Wallerstein see Robert Brenner, "The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism," New Left Review, 104 (July-August 1977): 25-93.

2. Introduction to William Beinart et al, Putting a Plough to the Ground: Accumulation and Dispossession in Rural South Africa, 1850-1930 (Johannesburg, 1986), 12; Colin Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry (London, 1979), reprinted in 1988 by David Philip and James Currey. A revision of his D.Phil. thesis completed at Oxford University under the supervision of Stanley Trapido, the book also grew out of an article published seven years earlier. See Colin Bundy, "The Emergence and Decline of a South African Peasantry," African Affairs, 71, 285 (1972): 369-88. The definition of peasants and peasantries has been the cause of some debate. Bundy's original definition (a rural cultivator enjoying access to a specific portion of land, the fruits of which he can dispose of as if he owned the land; and who, by the use of family labour seeks to satisfy the consumption needs of his family and to meet the demands rising from his involvement in a wider economic system) clearly embraced a wide range of people, from someone owning a thousand or more acres to a sharecropper on a white farm. Bundy, "Emergence and Decline," 370-1. Given this range the conceptual utility of the word would seem to vanish. For a sensible critique of the word peasant see Polly Hill, Development Economics on Trial: The Anthropological Case for a Prosecution (Cambridge, 1986), esp. 83-94. Fred Cooper raised the problem of differentiation and called for more nuanced histories of rural change. See Frederick Cooper, "Peasants, Capitalists and Historians: A Review Article," Journal of Southern African Studies, 7,2, (1981): 284-314, while Belinda. Bozzoli raised questions concerning the issue of gender. See her "Marxism, Feminism and South African Studies," Journal of Southern African Studies, 9, 2 (1983): 139-71. Bundy was sensitive to the criticisms, as reflected in his later collaborative work with William Beinart. See their Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa: Politics and Popular Movements in the Transkei and Eastern Cape, 1890-1930 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1987).

3. See www.ssrc.org/menu/development_and_political_economy.page for the most recent statement.

4. World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty (OUP).

5. World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty (OUP); Helen Epstein, "Time of Indifference," New York Review of Books 48, 6 (April 2001).

6. www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/Facts.asp.

7. Cosmos Desmond, The Discarded People: An Account of African Resettlement in South

Africa (Harmondsworth, 1971), 84-5.

8.Sen, Development as Freedom, 18.

9.Sen, Development as Freedom, 20. World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty (OUP), 15, 31. See also Martha Nussbaum, "Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings," in Nussbaum and Glover, eds., Women, Culture, and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities (OUP, 1995).

10.Make Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts: El Nino Famines and the Making of the Third World (London2001), 3.

11.Davis, Late Victorian 6, 8.

12.Davis is weakest on Africa. See Clifton Crais, "Past the Pax: A Review Article," Journal of Social History 36, 3 (Spring 2003): 759-66.

13.Beyond South Africa see, for example, Elizabeth Schmidt, Peasants, Traders and Wives: Shona Women in the History of Zimbabwe (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1992).

14.Before proceeding a few definitions are in order, in large part because the words social scientists use has been the subject of considerable debate, much of it stemming from the ideological perspective of the writer. We have defined systemic insecurity, which I shall be using synonymously with vulnerability, as a condition in which people find themselves particularly exposed to ecological, economic, institutional and political vicissitudes. Systemic insecurity is directly related to resiliency, in that the most vulnerable are often the ones least able to "bounce back" from drought, conflict, or sudden swings in the market economy. By subsistence crisis I mean a situation in which people are unable and scarcely able to meet basic food entitlements so that social reproduction of the household is itself endangered; this is different from a food shortage which is a periodic feature of most agrarian systems, the lean months before food crops ripen. As for famine, I borrow Watt's definition: "a societal crisis induced by the dissolution of accustomed availability of, and access to, staple foods on a scale sufficient to cause starvation among a significant number of individuals." Michael Watts, Silent Violence: Food, Famine and Peasantry in Northern Nigeria (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983), 13.

15.Michael Broers, "The Myth and Reality of Italian Regionalism: A Historical Geography of Napoleonic Italy, 1801-1814," American Historical Review 108, 3 (June 2003): 688-709, 692. See also Lamar and Thompson, eds., The Frontier in History: North America and Southern Africa Compared (New Haven,1981), esp.3-40, 76-122.

16.Janette Lindesay, "Past Climates of Southern Africa," in J. E. Hobbs, J. A. Lindesay and H. A. Bridgman, eds., Climates of the Southern Continents: Present, Past and Future (Chichester, 1998), 161-206.189. The classic work on weather in Southern Africa is P. D. Tyson, Climate

Change and Variability in South Africa (Cape Town, 1987) who argues against the idea of increasing desiccation and, instead, presents evidence for the existence of an 18-22 year cycle. I discuss climate in much greater detail in chapter two of A Century of Sorrow. See also Nancy J. Jacobs, Environment, Power, and Injustice: A South African History (Cambridge 2003).

17. Lindesay, "Past Climates of Southern Africa," 190.

18. Lindesay, "Past Climates of Southern Africa," 193, 189-95.

19. Verschuren, Laird and Cumming, "Rainfall and drought in equatorial east Africa during the past 1,100 years," Nature, no 6768, v. 403, (January 27, 2000): 410-414.

20. Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts.

21. E. M. Rasmusson, "Global climate Change and Variability," in Michael H. Glantz, Drought and Hunger in Africa (Cambridge, 1987), 11. See also Andreas Philipp and Jucundus Jacobeit, "Teleconnections between southern African summer rainfall and tropospheric circulation variability at monthly time scales," Climate Research Group, at <http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/geographie/klimaforschung/telekon.html>; Chapter Two: "ENSO and Drought in Southern Africa," at <http://www.esig.ucar.edu/sadc/chptr2.html>; "ENSO, Seasonal Rainfall Patterns and Zimbabwe Maize Yield," NASA, Goddard Institute for Space Studies, at http://www.giss.nasa.gov/research/intro/phillips_01/.

22. See <http://iri.columbia.edu/research/ENSO/tables/seafr.html>.

23. Litchenstein, Travels in Southern Africa, 351-2. Guy, Ballard, others, incl. Van der Kemp Transactions of the London Missionary Society, Van der Kemp, "Second Attempt to enter Caffraria," (London, 1804).

24. Quoted in Ballard, "Drought in South Africa," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 369. See also Jeff Guy, "Ecological Factors in the Rise of Shaka and the Zulu Kingdom," in Anthony Atmore and Shula Marks, eds., Economy and Society in Pre-industrial South Africa (London, 1980).

25. See Ballard, "Drought in South Africa."

26. Nicholson, quoted in Ballard, "Drought in South Africa," 361.

27. Steedman, Wanderings and Adventures, 2: 252-53.

28. Steedman, Wanderings and Adventures, 1: [check] 41.

29. Ballard, "Drought in South Africa," 363.

30.MMS 303, Shaw to Morley, 17 Dec. 1830.

31. See Elizabeth Eldredge, "Sources of Conflict in Southern Africa, c. 1800-1830," in Carolyn Hamilton, The Mfecane Aftermath (Johannesburg, 1995). It may well be that the reports of starvation, corpses, and cannibalism in the interior were as much a result of weather as of Zulu depredations.

32. Rasmusson, "Global climate Change and Variability," in Michael H. Glantz, Drought and Hunger in Africa (Cambridge, 1987), 10; Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts. Might want to check on dates, as it seems that the cape lags 18-24 months after ENSO event/affected regions within monsoonal areas. See Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts, 271 as well. See also Joao-Paulo Coelho and Gary Littlejohn, Mozambique: Case Study (UN, May 2000) which investigates the 1997-8 El Nino.

33. Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (New York, 1981), 100.

34. See Crais, Politics of Evil, 14-5. A sense of the military differential can be seen in the reports of soldiers. For example, one wrote that in a skirmish resulted in 69 Africans killed and 40 wounded with only one colonial troop severely hurt and two others with minor injuries. NAM 9605-4, letters from Private John Pine 1st battalion rifle brigade. I explore conflict in more detail in Chapter One of A Century of Sadness.

35. Conflict of course was not new to African communities. The very word "Xhosa," which means "angry men" and had been used long before the eighteenth century and the beginning of the colonial frontier wars, testifies to the presence of conflict within the African societies of the region. Precolonial patterns of conflict typically emerged around the creation of new communities, succession disputes and the attempts by chiefs to extend their control over neighboring peoples. Environmental conditions could be a motor of conflict as well as shaping how conflict unfolded; severe droughts around the turn of the century, for example, led to conflict in the western-most part of the region as people moved into new areas to maximize access to grasslands for their livestock. The absence of centralized political institutions in the region meant, among other things, that unlike the Zulu in the early nineteenth century African leaders in the Eastern Cape did not have a standing army at their command. Conflict tended to be characterized by short bursts of violence executed by people whose main responsibilities lay in the agriculture and pastoralism, not in waging protracted war. Waging war when one should be planting seed was anathema.

36. See, for example, Rodney Davenport and Christopher Saunders, South Africa: A Modern History (London, 2000); Leonard Thompson, A History of South Africa (New Haven 1995); Nigel Worden, The Making of Modern South Africa (Oxford, 1994). Another temptation has been to reduce conquest to simple economic "primitive accumulation." See, for example, Jack

Lewis, "An Economic History of the Ciskei: 1848-1900," (Ph.D. thesis, University of Cape Town, 1984). "The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry: A Critique and Reassessment," Journal of Southern African Studies, 11, 1 (1984): 1-24. Lewis provided one of the most trenchant critiques of Bundy, in part because of his work in the archival data. However, where Bundy's peasants responded to the market in ways that remain eerily similar to the "vent-for-surplus" model of an earlier historiography, Lewis' impoverished rural households produced simply because the state wanted money in the form of hut and other taxes. Moreover, despite his economic determinism and reductionism, Lewis' critique ended up pointing in the direction of the salience of political acts and demographic facts, the latter confined to a discussion of the ways in which population decline from starvation as a result of the 1856-7 Cattle Killing temporarily opened up land for cultivation. Lewis thus elaborated an argument that pointed in a direction diametrically opposite of the economy. He resolved the contradiction by collapsing together colonialism and capitalism. Historians of Central Africa have been more attuned to the later repercussions of conquest. See, for example, Phyllis M. Martin, "The Violence of Empire," in David Birmingham and Phyllis M. Martin, History of Central Africa.....1-26

37.Davenport and Saunders, South Africa; Thompson, History of South Africa; Worden, Making of Modern South Africa (Oxford, 1994). Marks and Rathbone, see 13; Iliffe, see 187.

38.See also book with same title

39.Sen; Nussbaum; World Bank, 6.

40.BPP 1635/52, Smith, "Arrangements of Movements," 21 Jan. 1852, encl. in Smith to Grey, 16 Feb. 1852.

41.(CL) MIC 220, Robinson to mother, 16 Mar. 1852.

42.GTJ, 5 Apr. 1851.

43.Quoted in Peires, Dead, 24.

44.MIC 220, Robinson to mother, n.d.[check this]; GTJ, 23 Oct. 1852.

45. GH 8/25, Brownlie to Maclean, 12 Oct. 1852. [check if brownlie was an official at the time.]. Indeed, the administration of Sir George Cathcart, who assumed control of the Cape Colony in April 1852, was, according to one highly placed official at the time, committed to "a thorough and unmistakable conquest." GH 8/28, Maclean, Notes,

46.See, for example, Smith's cattle drive; MIC 220, letter to mother, 18 Jan. 1852.

47.Beinart, Political Economy of Pondonland, 173.

48.NA 215

49.(CL) MS 785, Mackinnon to ?, 2 Mar. 1851.

50.check closely and note, peires, crais, mostert; GH 8/37, Maclean, Population Return, British Kaffraria, 1857; others.

51.Check...

52.Quoted in Peires, The Dead Will Arise, 21.

53.NAM 9605-4, letters from Private John Pine 1st battalion rifle brigade.

54.Quoted in Peires, The Dead Will Arise, 22.

55.BPP 279/1836, D'urban to Aberdeen, 19 June 1835.

56.BPP 279/1836, Glenelg to D'Urban, 26 Dec. 1835. The motors of violence—European and African—sent shivers of instability throughout the wider region, in general creating a more competitive and insecure world and causing substantial migrations of people into and out of the region, particularly in the decade of turmoil and considerable violence between 1828 and the mid 1830s. An additional important feature of this period was the use of Africans as colonial troops. In the 1834-5 war, about a thousand men, usually glossed in the colonial archive as "Fingo," assisted British troops in subjugating Xhosa belligerents across the Kei River. As with other Mfengu who moved into the colony, they received choice lands that had been confiscated from Xhosa. They also tended to convert to Christianity, so that Mfengu in this period tended to have better access to the state and to those Europeans who could assist them. See Alan Webster, "Unmasking the Fingo," in Hamilton, ed., The Mfecane Aftermath, 241-76, 266-7. This pattern continued through the nineteenth century. Those who fought the British typically found themselves moved to other parts within the wider region, in colonial parlance "assigned land," or found some of their lands given over to Africans who had fought alongside the colonial troops. Between the late 1850s and the 1870s the area between the Kei and Mbashe rivers saw enormous instability and frequent conflict, most of it directly related to events to the east. Following the Cattle Killing Xhosa living north of Butterworth saw their lands confiscated. This territory came to be divided roughly into Fingoland and Emigrant Thembuland. From the 1850s, and especially during the 1860s, at least 30,000 Mfengu migrated from the west and some 20,000 Thembu moved in from the east, with Xhosa under Sarhili increasingly confined to the area around Willowvale and Kentani.

Mfengu troops were used in all of the conflicts in the Transkei during the second half of the century. In addition to receiving cash wages and gaining access to land, they took part in the looting of African communities. Over two thousand Mfengu took part in the war of 1877, the "Gaika-Gcaleka Rebellion." In one engagement where the "enemy suffered severe loss," Mfengu troops "obtained much loot, namely, ploughs, corn, poultry, etc." GGR 42, Diary of the War, 9 Oct. 1877. The governor, observing that the region was now "absolutely at our disposal

and the people reduced by war or other causes to absolute submission," suggested "that it would be well to move Fingoes from the more crowded districts of the colony and settle them in the Transkei." GGR 46, memorandum by governor

57.Ibid, 71.

58.See Peires, *Dead*, 70-1.

59.GH 30/4, Grey to Maclean, 26 July 1855; GH 8/27, Brownlie to Maclean, 8 Aug. 1855.

60.GH 8/27, Brownlie to Maclean, 8 Aug. 1855.

61.GH 8/28, Ayliff to Maclean, 26 May 1856; GH 8/29, Brownlie to Maclean, 8 July 1856; GH 8/29, Brownlie to Maclean, 31 Aug. 1856.

62.GH 8/31, Brownlie to Maclean, 31 Dec. 1856.

63.GH 8/31, Brownlie to Maclean, 4 Jan. 1857.

64.See, for example, GH 8/31, Brownlie to Maclean, 21 Feb, 1857; GH 8/32, Maclean, Circular, 9 June 1857; ACC 793, Gawler to Chief Commissioner, 1 Apr. 1857; BK 71, Brownlie to Maclean, 15 Mar. 1857.

65.GH 8/32, Kaiser to Lucas, 18 June 1857.

66.GH 8/32, Maclean to Travers, 5 July 1857.

67.GH 8/32, Maclean, Circular, 9 June 1857,

68.GH 8/32, Fitzgerald to Maclean, 15 Aug. 1857. See also BK 71, Brownlie to Maclean, 12 Oct. 1857, on people dying on their way into the colony in search of work.

69.GH 8/32, Fitzgerald to Maclean, 30 Aug. 1857.

70.Vaughn, Story of an African Famine, 47.

71.Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts, 112-3.

72.Kumar, in Political Economy of Famine, 204. See also Arnold, Famine, 19-20.

73.Famines drive people from their homes, either on a short-term or long-term basis. As Arnold has observed, "migration. . . has been one of the more enduring demographic consequences of famine." Arnold, Famine, 22. Nineteenth-century famines in Ireland and in China killed as many people as they drove from their homes. Because our data is reasonably solid, we know

that over 40,000 people migrated west during the great crisis in the Eastern Cape. These numbers suggest that the mortality figure of about 40,000 is a reasonable estimate. Added to this figure is the upwards of 20,000 thousand people who died either as a direct or indirect result of the war earlier in the decade. Taken together, then, upwards of 60,000 people died in just over five years.

74. See, for example, GH 8/32, Reeve to Maclean, 15 June 1857; GH 8/33, Reeve to Maclean, 30 September 1857. Reeve reported that 4,000 had left the Middledrift area by June. Another 2,000 had left by September, so that "the tribe is reduced to one half its former number."

75. GH 8/33, Maclean, Census dated 1 Aug. 1857; GH 8/38, Population Return, 2 Jan. 1858; GH 8/40, Population Return, 19 Apr. 1859.

76. GH 8/32, Maclean to Travers, 5 July 1857.

77. GH 8/32, Maclean to Travers, 5 July 1857.

78. GH 8/31, Lucas to Maclean, 11 Mar. 1857.

79. GH 8/32, Brownlie to Maclean, 29 June 1857; Peires, The Dear Will Arise, 319.

80. BK 71, Brownlie to Maclean, 16 May 1857.

81. BK 89, Crouch to Maclean, 29 Oct. 1857.

82. BK 2, Grey to Maclean, 14 July 1858.

83. BK 2, Berrange to Southey, 15 Nov. 1858; GH 8/38, Peters to Maclean, 19 April 1859.

84. Arnold, Famine, 22.

85. Berry, 132

86. See Dasgupta, Inquiry, esp. 290-4 on the "tragedy of the commons."

87. See above; Ballard.

88. Evidence here.

89. See also Bozzoli, Women of Phokeng, 53: "The food that we eat today is not the same with [sic] what we ate in the past. We have changed to mielie meal instead of sorghum porridge, this mielie meal has no nutritional value and is not good for us!" See also Jacobs, Environment, Power and Injustice, 61.

90.This and the following paragraphs are based on Marvin P. Miracle, Maize in Tropical Africa (Madison, 1966) and <http://www/fao.org/DOCREP/T0818e/T0818E0d.htm>. See also Little, The Elusive Granary.

91.Cf. Wylie, on storage, who is incorrect. Over the course of the last century older forms of storage have gradually disappeared

92.This is the title of Wylie's recent book, taken from an anonymous 1938 source, though she misses the full irony of the statement. Diana Wylie, Starving on a Full Stomach (Charlottesville, 2001).

93.See Scheper-Hughes, Death Without Weeping, 162.

94.The increasing reliance on maize can be seen from statistics on Pondoland collected by William Beinart. Over all, between 1896 and 1937 production of sorghum declined while the population increased by 176 per cent. Maize production, however, increased dramatically, almost five hundred per cent during the same time period though this production history exhibited very high variability. Where in 1896 production figures averaged 138 pounds of maize and 85 pounds of sorghum per person, in 1921 the figures had shifted to 235 pounds of maize and a mere 13 pounds of sorghum per person. In other words people were producing nearly twice as much maize and six times less sorghum. Also: [By way of analogy, US consumption of flour in 1996 was 148 lbs. per person]

95.(WITS) SAIRR, Box AD 843, Dr. E. Jokl, A Labour and Manpower Survey of the Transkeian Territories, (SAIRR, 1943), 8, 9.

96.The so-called Giffen paradox. See Peter D. Little, The Elusive Granary: Herder, Farmer, and State in Northern Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992),. 119, 117-34. What is also unclear is the relationship between participating in the market economy and the distribution of food within the household.

97.Quoted in Beinart, Political Economy of Pondoland, 53.

98.Beinart, Political Economy of Pondoland, 53.

99.See Peter D. Little, The Elusive Granary: Herder, Farmer, and State in Northern Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992),. 119, 117-34.

100.Hill, Development Economics, 72:

101. Debt, as many have observed, steadily worsened over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the past Africans redistributed surplus food across the community in ways that created relationships of debt but also a modicum of security. Debt was not desirable,

but it also was seldom a catastrophe. The community comprised an important lattice within which the unfortunate or the unwise were able to survive.

102. NA 657, Stratford to Civil Commissioner, Peddie, 31 Jan. 1905.

103. Whitehead, "Rural Women and Food Production," in Sen and Dreze, 435-6. [CHECK QUOTE AS YOU MAY HAVE TO ADD AN ELLIPSIS.]

104. See Mintz, Sweetness and Power.

105. This is a feature of much of the impoverished world, and also a feature of pre-industrial Europe. various notes here

106. Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York, 2003).

107. Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others, 125.